If you lived through Nigeria’s Ebola scare in 2014, you probably remember the atmosphere before you remember the statistics.
Handshakes suddenly became suspicious. “Don’t eat bush meat” became a familiar warning. Schools checked pupils’ temperatures at the gates, and an unexplained fever could be enough to send a child home.
I was in secondary school then, and I remember the quiet anxiety of approaching the school gate and hoping the thermometer would give me a normal reading. There was a curfew-like feeling in the air even when no curfew had been declared.
Ebola had arrived in Lagos, and for several tense weeks, Nigeria seemed to be holding its breath.
The story ended well. Nigeria contained the outbreak and was declared Ebola-free on October 20, 2014, after recording 20 confirmed cases and eight deaths.
Twelve years later, Ebola is again dominating public health conversations in Africa. But this time, the virus is a different species, the outbreak is centred in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Nigeria is preparing before the first case crosses its borders.
That distinction matters.
What is happening in the DRC?
The current outbreak was first detected in early May in Ituri Province in northeastern DRC after health authorities became concerned about clusters of severe illness and deaths, including among healthcare workers.
Laboratory testing at the National Institute of Biomedical Research in Kinshasa confirmed Bundibugyo virus disease on May 15. The same day, the DRC declared its 17th Ebola outbreak since the virus was first identified in the country in 1976.
Uganda also reported Bundibugyo virus infections linked to travel from the DRC, prompting the World Health Organisation to declare the situation a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on May 17.
The outbreak has since expanded dramatically.
By August 12, the DRC had recorded 4,665 confirmed cases and 2,184 deaths, according to figures reported by Congolese authorities. Bas-Uélé became the sixth affected province after a confirmed case was detected in Buta.
That represents a much larger outbreak than the situation described in earlier reports from May and July, when the number of confirmed infections was still in the hundreds and low thousands. WHO reported 2,124 confirmed cases and 828 deaths as of July 15.
The speed of the increase is one of the most worrying features of the outbreak.
Why is this outbreak particularly difficult?
Part of the answer lies in where the outbreak is occurring.
Eastern DRC has been affected by conflict, displacement and insecurity for years. It is also a region where people move frequently for trade, healthcare and work, including around mining areas.
WHO has warned that insecurity can restrict the movement of surveillance teams, rapid-response personnel and laboratory samples. Population movement and cross-border travel also create opportunities for the virus to move between communities before health authorities can identify and isolate cases.
This is not simply a medical problem. It is also a problem of geography, security, transport and trust.
The outbreak has already crossed an international border into Uganda. France has also reported an imported Bundibugyo virus case involving a medical doctor who had returned from the DRC, while humanitarian workers have required evacuation to Europe for treatment.
So, what exactly is Bundibugyo virus?
This is where the 2014 comparison becomes important.
“Ebola” is not the name of one single virus. Several viruses in the orthoebolavirus group can cause Ebola disease.
The 2014 outbreak that reached Nigeria was caused by the Zaire Ebola virus, the species responsible for the devastating West African epidemic.
The current outbreak is caused by Bundibugyo virus, a different species first identified during an outbreak in Uganda in 2007.
Previous Bundibugyo outbreaks have had substantial fatality rates. WHO says the case fatality rates in the two previous outbreaks ranged from 30 to 50 per cent, while the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention records fatality rates of about 25 per cent in Uganda's 2007 outbreak and 50 per cent in the DRC's 2012 outbreak.
And there is another major difference.
There is currently no licensed vaccine specifically for Bundibugyo virus and no approved specific treatment for the disease. Care therefore relies heavily on early diagnosis, isolation, infection prevention and control, and supportive medical treatment.
That does not mean Ebola is untreatable. Early supportive care can significantly improve a patient's chances of survival.
Scientists are also studying potential medical countermeasures, including treatments that could eventually be used against Bundibugyo virus.
Does that mean Nigerians should panic?
No.
In fact, panic is one of the least useful responses to an outbreak like this.
Ebola is serious, but it does not spread through the air in the way respiratory viruses such as measles or COVID-19 can. Transmission occurs primarily through direct contact with the blood or other bodily fluids of an infected person, or through contaminated materials.
That means sitting beside somebody on a bus, passing someone in a market or simply being in the same room with a person does not automatically expose you to Ebola.
The CDC says people infected with Bundibugyo virus generally do not spread the virus before symptoms begin. The incubation period can range from two to 21 days.
The practical lesson is therefore not to fear everyone with a fever.
It is to take unexplained illness seriously, particularly when there is a relevant travel or exposure history.
What do CDC and NCDC actually do?
The two names can easily become confusing during an international outbreak.
The CDC, or Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, is the United States' national public health agency. It monitors disease threats, supports outbreak investigations and provides guidance on preventing diseases from spreading into and within the United States.
During the current outbreak, the US introduced enhanced travel screening and other public health measures involving travellers from affected countries.
The NCDC, or Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, performs the equivalent national public health coordination role in Nigeria.
Its responsibilities include disease surveillance, laboratory systems, outbreak response, emergency preparedness and supporting states during public health emergencies.
In this outbreak, the NCDC is the agency Nigerians should look to for official information about Nigeria's preparedness and any suspected or confirmed case in the country.
What is Nigeria doing?
Nigeria is not waiting for an imported case before preparing.
On May 28, the NCDC issued a national public health advisory warning states about the evolving Bundibugyo outbreak and calling for immediate preparedness.
The agency assessed Nigeria's overall risk of importation as high, citing international travel, regional population movement, major airports and seaports, porous land borders, informal crossings and trade routes. It also pointed out an important challenge: the early symptoms of Ebola can resemble common illnesses such as malaria and Lassa fever.
That means preparedness has to begin before anyone knows whether a fever is Ebola.
States have been asked to strengthen surveillance, ensure they can detect and report suspected cases quickly, prepare isolation and referral arrangements, protect health workers and maintain laboratory and infection-prevention capacity.
NCDC has also issued updated case definitions for Ebola viral disease to support health workers in identifying suspected cases.
The agency's approach is essentially to build several layers of defence: detect a possible case early, investigate it quickly, isolate the patient safely, test rapidly, identify contacts and prevent further transmission.
What can Nigeria learn from 2014?
Perhaps the most important lesson is that preparedness works.
On July 20, 2014, Liberian-American Patrick Sawyer collapsed at Murtala Muhammed International Airport in Lagos after travelling from Liberia. He was subsequently diagnosed with Ebola.
Nigeria's response involved rapid activation of an emergency operations centre, intensive contact tracing, laboratory testing, isolation and monitoring of exposed people.
Health authorities ultimately tracked hundreds of contacts, and Nigeria contained the outbreak before it became the catastrophe many feared.
WHO declared Nigeria Ebola-free on October 20, 2014, just 42 days after the last known case was discharged.
That experience remains one of the strongest arguments for acting early.
But today's circumstances are not identical.
The present outbreak is occurring in a different region, involves a different Ebola species and is unfolding in a setting marked by conflict and severe humanitarian pressures. Most importantly, there is no licensed Bundibugyo vaccine to provide the kind of protection available against Zaire Ebola.
What should Nigerians actually do?
The advice is considerably less dramatic than some social media posts may suggest.
Wash your hands regularly.
Do not ignore a sudden, unexplained fever or other serious symptoms.
If you become seriously ill, seek care from a proper health facility rather than relying on rumours or unverified home remedies.
If you have recently travelled from an affected area or had a known exposure to someone with Ebola, tell the healthcare provider about that history.
And perhaps most importantly, do not turn WhatsApp forwards into public health policy.
The 2014 outbreak produced its own wave of misinformation, including dangerous claims that drinking concentrated salt water could prevent Ebola. Such rumours can be more than merely foolish; they can kill.
Today, Nigeria has something it did not have before 2014: experience.
The country has already seen what happens when a frightening disease arrives unexpectedly and public health officials have to move quickly. The lesson from that episode was not that Ebola was harmless. It was that early detection, disciplined contact tracing, infection control, clear communication and public cooperation can stop a dangerous virus from becoming a national disaster.
So the sensible response to the current outbreak is neither complacency nor panic.
It is vigilance.
As of the latest information available, Nigeria has recorded no confirmed case linked to the 2026 Bundibugyo outbreak. NCDC has nevertheless classified the risk of importation as high and is urging states to strengthen their readiness before a suspected case appears.
The memory of 2014 should therefore serve less as a reason to panic than as a reminder.
Nigeria has done this before.
And if the virus does arrive, the most important defence may once again be the quiet, disciplined work that happens before the public even notices there is an emergency.