A former military officer, Dangiwa
Umar has always been in the news. He has never failed to air his views on
critical matters in the country and he was one of the key issues in the
annulled June 12, 1993 Presidential Elections.
In this interview he granted ‘The
Interview Magazine,’ recently Dangiwa speaks on several issues including why
former president Goodluck Jonathan took some of the actions he took as
president and why he had to concede defeat to President Muhammadu Buhari even
as an incumbent leader with much power.
Before the May 29 handover last
year, you predicted that many of those hanging around former President Goodluck
Jonathan would desert him. It turned out exactly like that. Why does it happen
this way?
You don't
need to be clairvoyant to know this. Governor Adams Oshiomhole, who generously
praised Jonathan as a true democrat, suddenly turned into his most virulent
critic. We now know that the former President is indebted to Chief Tony Anenih
to the tune of hundreds of millions of naira. Of course, most of Jonathan's
friends were ardent admirers and loyalists of some of his predecessors. Tony
Anenih was SDP chairman and therefore a keen supporter of MKO Abiola. He found
his way to Abacha's court, while both Abiola and Obasanjo were in Abacha's
prison. He emerged as the closest confidant of President Obasanjo, heading his
illegal and disgraceful third term project. The same crowd unabashedly trooped
to the 'man of the moment', President Muhammadu Buhari and volunteered to
advise him on how to deal with former President Jonathan.
In 2014 the Department of State
Services (DSS) was said to have sent a report to former President Jonathan that
some top Northerners, including Professor Ango Abdullahi, met with you in your
house in Kaduna and planned to arm 2000 Northern youths against the government.
What became of the report?
Well no
evidence was found to warrant any further action by the office of the President
and so it was discarded or overtaken by more serious national security
challenges. But I was incensed by that wicked attempt to besmirch my image by
the DG, DSS. It was simply a case of giving a dog a bad name in order to hang
it. What made it more shocking was the timing, coming a few days after the
first Nyanya bombing. The attention of the DSS ought to have been fully focused
on trying to identify the perpetrators and collecting actionable intelligence
to secure the nation from these sorts of attacks. Instead, the DSS was pre-occupied
with fabricating mischief and creating more enemies for the President. Any wonder then that the DSS
has been found the most wanting in the war against the Boko Haram insurgency?
You accused the DG DSS at the time,
Mr.lta Ekpeyong, of being "a small tyrant" and fabricating the report
against you. But why would he do that?
Well I
honestly don't want to go into details because the President pleaded with me to
forgive since he did not believe the report and actually instructed the DG to
call and apologise, which he did. I forgave him, but Prof Ango Abdullahi, who I
had not seen in over 10 years at the time of the report, called to inform me of
his intention to sue the DSS and I agreed he should. One of those identified at
the meeting was a retired AIG from Daura who, unknown to the DSS, had died in
the early 90s - about 20 years ago. Why would they do this? Well, I can only
imagine that the DG was not happy with my constant criticism of their
highhandedness and general human rights abuses. I accused the DSS of framing
Dr. Mohammed Yunus, a Kogi State University lecturer, as being a kingpin of
Boko Haram. There was enough evidence to show that the poor fellow was a strong
critic of the sect. He devoted a chapter in his doctoral thesis to condemning
the sect and what he termed their anti-Islamic activities. He was also known to
be a critic of the discriminatory recruitment policy of the DSS. For this, he
was arrested and paraded on TV with some Boko Haram suspects, who were tortured
and forced to falsely incriminate him. He was discharged and acquitted by an
Abuja magistrate court after spending over two years in Kuje Prison. I also
publicly condemned the DSS for providing a false report on some fee-paying
squatters in an abandoned building allegedly owned by a senior public servant,
at Apo, Abuja. They were also falsely accused of belonging to the Boko Haram
sect. The military stormed the building based on the DSS report, killed eight
of them and injured many more. It was later discovered that all the squatters
were labourers and none had any connection with Boko Haram. I am sure you are
curious to know how I got to see a report addressed to Mr. President and other
heads of security agencies. It was one of the heads of the agencies that were
victims of the DSS campaign of calumny that alerted me. Appreciating the
sensitive nature of the report, I immediately reached out to a senior aide of
the President. The President then called for the report. He was shocked by its
contents. I was summoned to a meeting with the President at which he apologised
for the DGs indiscretion. He tried to reassure me that he did not believe the
report and he told the DG so. I advised him to remain focused on the most
serious security challenge, the war against Boko Haram insurgency. We reviewed
the worsening security situation, particularly the activities of the sect,
which were spreading from the northeast to other northern states, including the
FCT, Abuja. I asked him if he'd read General Buhari's condemnation of the sect.
He expressed admiration and gratitude for the General's moral courage and
wished that other national figures, particularly from the North, would do the
same. I honestly expected the President to dismiss the DG DSS, but instead, I received
a shocker. Just as I was about to leave, the President said, "'You know,
when I asked the DG to verify his facts, he insisted that he stands by his report."
This indicated that the President was not fully convinced of my innocence. As
if to confirm my suspicion, the DGs term was extended a few weeks after. His
Kaduna Director, whom he identified as the source, denied being the author and
did not even know of the existence of the report. But as they say, all that is
now history. But let me reiterate that no such meeting ever took place. I supported
Jonathan in his most trying time as Acting President, when he was fighting
several battles for acceptance and legitimacy. I did so pro bono. I felt
betrayed and discouraged, but did not abandon him.
You were reported to have played a
prominent role in getting former president Jonathan to fortify security around
General Buhari (then the leader of the All Progressives Congress) before his
convoy was attacked in Kaduna. What exactly was your role?
As I
mentioned earlier, in the course of our discussion about the activities of the
Boko Haram, I drew the attention of President Jonathan to the recent statement
by Gen. Buhari condemning the Boko Haram insurgents for their un-Islamic
terrorist activities. My aim was to dispel the ridiculous theory that some
Northern elders were supporting the insurgents with the aim to destabilise
Jonathan's administration. I advised him to reinforce security around the
General as the Boko Haram was most likely going to target him as they often had
their detractors, including Sheikh Jaafar Adam, Sheikh Albani and General
Muhammadu Shuwa among others. He agreed and summoned one of his senior aides,
who was said to be a "Buhari man." He instructed him to reach out to
the General and plead with him to accept extra security from the Federal
Government in view of the likely threat from Boko Haram. I also asked an
associate of the General to try to convince him not to reject the extra
security offer from the Federal Government as it was his entitlement. As it
turned out, my prediction was confirmed. Barely a fortnight later, the General
narrowly escaped assassination when his convoy was attacked at Kawo, Kaduna.
Mercifully, he escaped unharmed. But within hours of the incident, some of the
General's supporters or political opportunists publicly accused the Federal
Government of being responsible, obviously oblivious of the danger this
portended for the peace and stability of the nation. I immediately condemned
their unreasonable claim in an effort to douse the tension.
Do you think that intervention
helped to save the General's life?
To the
extent that security around him was beefed up by the Federal Government, even
if, as it was later revealed, the car in which he was riding was not provided
by the government, he was saved from being assassinated. To God be the glory. I
cannot take credit for this. If anybody deserves credit, it is former president
Jonathan and of course General Buhari's security detail and Buhari himself for
not panicking during the vicious attack.
After Jonathan conceded defeat, you
described him as "a statesman". Do you seriously think this was an
act of statesmanship more than one of personal survival?
My
interpretation of personal survival in this kind of situation is to tenaciously
cling to power irrespective of the harm this may cause the nation and of course
the incumbent. Our African experience has been for incumbents to choose this
injurious option. President Jonathan could have easily placed his personal
interest above national consideration. He patriotically and commendably decided
to congratulate General Buhari even before the final results were announced.
This act alone has crowned him as a statesman. He will forever be a beacon of
hope for the growth of democracy in Africa. He should be respected and used as
a role model for his personal sacrifice.
Given the circumstances at the
time, did Jonathan have a choice?
He could
have easily placed personal interest above our national interest. The
circumstances you may be referring to are that Jonathan had become aware of his
unpopularity and that his defeat was imminent. Gen. Buhari was such a popular
candidate, whose defeat could have only been achieved through massive rigging,
which would have caused the country to implode. But under similar circumstances,
Third World leaders dig in and fight to the last man. Many examples abound;
Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, Cote d'ivoire's
Laurent Gbagbo, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Nkurunziza of Burundi, to name a
few. The more threatened such incumbents feel the more desperate they become to
survive. Jonathan resolved, even if he was desperately campaigning to win
re-election, that, "my political interest is not worth the blood of any
Nigerian." He proved this by his decision to concede. It is an act of
statesmanship. Do you honestly believe that a peaceful transfer would have
happened if Gen. Buhari had defeated President Obasanjo in the 2003 election or
his candidate, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua in 2007?
You appear to have a soft spot for former
president Jonathan. Many think he was weak and ineffective. Do you agree?
I need to
make it clear that the Jonathan I initially struck close acquaintance with,
even as a vice-president, was a very simple and kind-hearted person. He was, no
doubt, forced on to the stage not well prepared for national leadership. From
the outset, he found himself having to fight for survival on many fronts. He
also inherited a most virulent insurgency by the Boko Haram. If he appeared
weak and ineffective, you have to view that from this background. In fact his
strange tendency to defend some of his most callous officials must have been
informed by his desire to attract and retain loyalists who provided him with
the much-needed support in a hostile political environment. Most of those
loyalists took advantage of his seeming weakness to inflict damage on his
reputation and that of his government.
I concede
that in terms of strength of character, Jonathan is not an Obasanjo or even a
President Buhari, but could he have done more in the war against corruption?
Absolutely. In fact, some of us tried to get him to move against some of his
most important erring ministers, but that did not happen. Did he have the
political strength or strength of character to call President Obasanjo to
account over the power sector probe that discovered a monumental waste of
public funds or even commence the prosecution of 33 former governors indicted
by Nuhu Ribadu of the EFCC? I doubt very much. That he didn't do these and some
of the other high profile cases contributed to public perception that he was
weak and clueless.
Could his
administration have done more in the war against Boko Haram? Definitely. But again, in our assessment of that
administration's performance, we need to take into account the nature of the
threat of the enemy. People often talk about the stellar record of the Nigerian
military in international peace keeping operations and compare it with its
seeming weakness in the war against Boko Haram. This is very unfair. The Boko
Haram insurgency cannot be compared to those peacekeeping operations. It is
more challenging and complicated. It is more difficult to fight an enemy such
as Boko Haram that does not present targets you can attack. An enemy that has
no regard for any principles or laws of warfare; it is difficult to engage an
enemy that can easily blend with the very people you are out to defend. The
military inherited by former president Jonathan was more familiar with
conventional warfare and it took a while for it to adapt and become proficient
in fighting asymmetrical warfare (war without a front). However, there is no
question that given more funding, more and better equipment and greater
motivation, the military could have achieved much more as was witnessed from
January to April 2015.
It is our
wish that this administration defeats the Boko Haram insurgency, but if victory
means the total annihilation of the threat including suicide attacks on soft
targets, then victory is a long way away. I salute the courage and performance
of our troops and the zeal being demonstrated by our leaders, but we must be
patient in our high expectations. There is no quick fix in counter-insurgency
operations. The Americans and other world powers are learning this lesson the
hard way in their war against the Taliban in Afghanistan and ISIS in the Middle
East. While relying on our military to combat the insurgents, we should also
try to understand the creed of the insurgents to be able to understand their
motivation. We must try to cut off their sources of recruitment by addressing
the socio-economic problems of their catchment area. We should also seek
support from the international community to cut off the sect's strategic
logistics and financial supply sources.
You advised President Buhari to be
wary of giving a bailout to the insolvent states. You don't think he should
give them any bailout at all?
Yes I
did, for the simple reason that most of these states became insolvent not only
because of the lack of any serious effort to raise Internally Generated Revenue
(IGR), but also because their chief executives embarked on what the President
would characterise as squander-mania; irresponsible expenditure on personal
administration, maintenance of bloated manpower and execution of projects of
dubious socio-economic benefit. Unless they change their ways, they will never
be weaned from the Federal Government's feeding bottle.
About 27 states were badly affected
and can still barely pay salaries. What could have been done to stop the states
from descending to this level?
Restructure
the federation. Get the states to re-order their priorities. Do you know that
the new Kebbi Airport, which cost above N20bn, is about 120km away from Sokoto
International Airport? Why should this project be a priority instead of
agriculture and educational development? Who are the passengers; the governor,
members of his family and cabinet?
Some people have criticised the
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which they blame for our subsequent
economic woes. What's your response to that?
I was one
of the staunchest opponents of the Structural Adjustment Programme. I was wrong
and its proponents were quite correct. Those who criticised the SAP, which was
started in 1986, tend to be swayed by their unrealistic holding on to the past,
when everything about our economy was glorious. For example, the Naira
exchanged for US$2 and was almost at par with the British pound. Because of
this very unrealistic exchange rate, imports were quite cheap. A 50kg bag of
rice cost about N20, an average car cost less than N3,000. The economy was
highly regulated, all aimed at keeping such imports cheap. The problem was that
this discouraged local production, reduced export and therefore effective
diversification of the economy. We used oil revenue to sustain this unrealistic
economic 'prosperity.' It was this negative trend that SAP was created to
adjust. Its core doctrine was total deregulation of the economy. Some of its
elements were privatisation of public enterprises, withdrawal of wasteful
subsidies and deregulation of forex aimed at efficient allocation and
conservation.
For you
to appreciate the achievements of SAP, you have to understand that between 1960
and 1986, federal parastatals cost government over N500bn and as at the point
of SAP, they were all dependent on the Federal Government for subvention.
To be
able to maintain the high and unrealistic value of the Naira, government had to
engage in external borrowing. There is no doubt that SAP caused the general
populace a lot of pain, but its benefits far overweigh its ills. Can you
imagine what our economy would look like if we decide to abandon SAP and return
to a regulated economy or a command economy with most private enterprises like
banks, communications, airlines, power coming under government ownership? They
would collapse. Corruption by public officers would increase. General Obasanjo
was one of the staunchest critics of SAP. We all expected his administration to
jettison the programme, but not only did he advance its implementation, he also
took it to a ridiculous extent by selling Federal Government houses. To be fair
to the proponents of SAP they warned, 'Things could get worse before they get
better."
In a recent interview, we
challenged Gen Ibrahim Babangida, quoting what you once said, that the reason
for not handing over to Abiola was personal. IBB said you were too young (in
the service) to call him out on the annulment of the June 12 1993 elections. Do
you accept that?
I
honestly cannot remember making that statement. But all I can say is this. As
young as I was in relation to the generals, I occupied a vantage point as the
commandant of armoured corps centre and so was able to observe and understand
the political manoeuvres that led to the annulment of an election that even the
government adjudged as the freest and fairest in our electoral history.
Gen Babangida said the military
prepared three options, including one that would have returned the country to
fresh elections within about nine months, but the press and civil society kept
pushing the country to the brink. Is that correct?
You are
beginning to sound like Jerry Springer. What are you trying to do? You want to
push me to contradict a General. No, I won't swallow the bait. I can only say
that the annulment was a monumental error for which IBB has taken full
responsibility as the head of the administration, even if I still believe it
was a collective responsibility. I am sure that one day the true story will be
told, either by him or by some of the major actors.
How do you recall the events
leading up to and immediately following the annulment of the June 12 election?
I don't
want to sound like a broken record by continuing to discuss June 12. It was not
out of any desire to emerge a hero that I advertised my opposition to the
annulment. There are no heroes but victims and villains. I believe I am one of
the victims ... You may recall that a popular magazine mischievously reported
that I was head of a committee that advised government to suspend the conduct
of the June 12 presidential election barely a week to the event. I honestly
believed that doing so would throw the nation into a violent crisis. With
hindsight I may have overestimated public reaction particularly from the South
West. I was however, willing to risk everything to clarify my stand. I could
not afford to be associated with any action that was capable of leading to the
total disintegration of a country I swore to defend. I joined movements within
the armed forces aimed at reversing the annulment including one led by the late
Gen Sani Abacha. Unfortunately, I was led in the wrong direction and we all
lost a great opportunity.
Did you ever meet Abiola before and
after the election was annulled?
I met MKO
Abiola once and it was at the National Stadium, Surulere, Lagos during the Challenge
Cup final between his Abiola Babes Football Club and our Kaduna Ranchers Bees.
You may be surprised to know that up until the time of my retirement, Abiola
was convinced that I was one of the officers behind the annulment and had sworn
to topple the administration if it insisted on restoring his mandate. I could
have been the first to have been jailed by President Abiola before he would
have discovered the truth.
What was your reaction when you heard
about his death?
Of course,
I felt pity for his traumatised and destabilised family. But you know.
Were you surprised that the interim
government collapsed and Abacha took over?
No. I was
not surprised. My only surprise was that IBB trusted Abacha and his supporting
cast or co-conspirators to "provide a protective court" to the
interim government. This was akin to handing over your goat to hyenas for
safekeeping and upkeep. Let us close this chapter.
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