The hack, one of the most dramatic since Russia's full-scale
invasion nearly two years ago, knocked out services provided by Ukraine's
biggest telecoms operator for some 24 million users for days from Dec. 12.
In an interview, Illia Vitiuk, head of the Security Service
of Ukraine's (SBU) cybersecurity department, disclosed exclusive details about
the hack, which he said caused "disastrous" destruction and aimed to
land a psychological blow and gather intelligence.
"This attack is a big message, a big warning, not only
to Ukraine, but for the whole Western world to understand that no one is
actually untouchable," he said. He noted Kyivstar was a wealthy, private
company that invested a lot in cybersecurity.
The attack wiped "almost everything", including
thousands of virtual servers and PCs, he said, describing it as probably the
first example of a destructive cyberattack that "completely destroyed the
core of a telecoms operator."
During its investigation, the SBU found the hackers probably
attempted to penetrate Kyivstar in March or earlier, he said in a Zoom
interview on Dec. 27.
"For now, we can say securely, that they were in the
system at least since May 2023," he said. "I cannot say right now,
since what time they had ... full access: probably at least since
November."
The SBU assessed the hackers would have been able to steal
personal information, understand the locations of phones, intercept
SMS-messages and perhaps steal Telegram accounts with the level of access they
gained, he said.
A Kyivstar spokesperson said the company was working closely
with the SBU to investigate the attack and would take all necessary steps to
eliminate future risks, adding: "No facts of leakage of personal and
subscriber data have been revealed."
Vitiuk said the SBU helped Kyivstar restore its systems
within days and to repel new cyber attacks.
"After the major break there were a number of new
attempts aimed at dealing more damage to the operator," he said.
Kyivstar is the biggest of Ukraine's three main telecoms
operators and there are some 1.1 million Ukrainians who live in small towns and
villages where there are no other providers, Vitiuk said.
People rushed to buy other SIM cards because of the attack,
creating large queues. ATMs using Kyivstar SIM cards for the internet ceased to
work and the air-raid siren - used during missile and drone attacks - did not
function properly in some regions, he said.
He said the attack had no big impact on Ukraine's military,
which did not rely on telecoms operators and made use of what he described as
"different algorithms and protocols".
"Speaking about drone detection, speaking about missile
detection, luckily, no, this situation didn't affect us strongly," he
said.
RUSSIAN SANDWORM
Investigating the attack is harder because of the wiping of
Kyivstar's infrastructure.
Vitiuk said he was "pretty sure" it was carried
out by Sandworm, a Russian military intelligence cyberwarfare unit that has
been linked to cyberattacks in Ukraine and elsewhere.
A year ago, Sandworm penetrated a Ukrainian telecoms
operator, but was detected by Kyiv because the SBU had itself been inside
Russian systems, Vitiuk said, declining to identify the company. The earlier
hack has not been previously reported.
Russia's defence ministry did not respond to a written
request for comment on Vitiuk's remarks.
Vitiuk said the pattern of behaviour suggested telecoms
operators could remain a target of Russian hackers. The SBU thwarted over 4,500
major cyberattacks on Ukrainian governmental bodies and critical infrastructure
last year, he said.
A group called Solntsepyok, believed by the SBU to be
affiliated with Sandworm, said it was responsible for the attack.
Vitiuk said SBU investigators were still working to
establish how Kyivstar was penetrated or what type of trojan horse malware
could have been used to break in, adding that it could have been phishing,
someone helping on the inside or something else.
If it was an inside job, the insider who helped the hackers
did not have a high level of clearance in the company, as the hackers made use
of malware used to steal hashes of passwords, he said.
Samples of that malware have been recovered and are being
analysed, he added.
Kyivstar's CEO, Oleksandr Komarov, said on Dec. 20 that all
the company's services had been fully restored throughout the country. Vitiuk
praised the SBU's incident response effort to safely restore the systems.
The attack on Kyivstar may have been made easier because of
similarities between it and Russian mobile operator Beeline, which was built
with similar infrastructure, Vitiuk said.
The sheer size of Kyivstar's infrastructure would have been
easier to navigate with expert guidance, he added.
The destruction at Kyivstar began at around 5:00 a.m. local
time while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy was in Washington, pressing
the West to continue supplying aid.
Vitiuk said the attack was not accompanied by a major
missile and drone strike at a time when people were having communication
difficulties, limiting its impact while also relinquishing a powerful
intelligence-gathering tool.
Why the hackers chose Dec. 12 was unclear, he said, adding:
"Maybe some colonel wanted to become a general." -Reuters